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The Political Environment of Federal Rulemaking: 
An Analysis of Comment Submissions on Regulatory Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
During the Obama administration, waves of new legislation upended regulatory environments in 
finance and healthcare. At the forefront of these changes were the federal bureaucracies tasked 
with adopting and implementing new rules based on the legislation. This thesis examines final 
rules published by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Health and 
Human Services related to the Dodd-Frank Act and Affordable Care Act to determine which 
organized interests have an advantage during the notice-and-comment period required by the 
Administrative Procedures Act, what factors encourage agencies to change proposed rules, and 
how regulatory bureaucracies differ from public service agencies on these topics. The results 
indicate that biases towards particular types of commenters exist, but those biases differ across 
different types of agencies. Furthermore, coalitions of commenters are effective at achieving 
desired results in both types of agencies. 
 
 
 
 
By 
Michael Testa 
May 3, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
Political scientists have studied the role of interest groups for decades, and more recently, 
even the public has taken notice of crony capitalism. Despite the increased attention, very few 
researchers have examined how interest groups influence bureaucracies even though these 
agencies maintain a significant role in policymaking and affect most Americans’ everyday lives. 
Unfortunately, this lack of oversight allows powerful interests to manipulate discretionary tasks 
performed by federal agencies. Previous studies account for these interests’ relationships with 
well-known regulatory agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration, and the National Labor Relations Board, but these agencies all 
have one thing in common: they are regulators of powerful business interests. Academics give 
almost no attention to public service agencies even though these types of agencies frequently 
publish rules and have clientele who are acutely aware of these regulations (Golden 1998).  
General differences exist between traditional regulatory bureaucracies and public service 
agencies which are worth considering. Traditional regulatory agencies generally restrict business 
practices using rules to promote general welfare and eliminate externalities. Product safety laws 
and environmental regulations are good examples. Alternatively, in a public service agency, 
rules often establish procedures for the implementation and administration of services such as 
healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Their clientele includes both intermediaries like states 
and organizations who administer services and the recipients of those services. The differences 
between rules providing services versus rules governing businesses likely leads to differences in 
who lobbies federal agencies, how stakeholders interact with federal agencies, and how federal 
agencies respond to these interests. Previously, very few studies have attempted to identify these 
differences and examine their effects on federal agencies. 
To determine how organized interests influence public service agencies compared to 
traditional regulatory agencies, this paper focuses specifically on public comments submitted to 
rules published in response to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
respectively. Both the Dodd-Frank Act and Affordable Care Act significantly changed the 
regulatory environment, and therefore, present an optimal opportunity to examine how interests 
responded to these changes.   
Three rules from each agency and the corresponding comments were examined. For each 
specific request within a comment, the commenter’s position (either supporting or opposing the 
rule), the commenter’s name, the type of commenter, the agency’s response to that request, and a 
variable on the inclusion of evidence in the request were coded. With this information, two 
ordinary least squares regressions were created.  In one model the dependent variable was 
measured by favorable outcomes; a variable measuring if the agency did what the commenter 
requested. In the second model, the dependent variable was the percentage of favorable 
outcomes in a rule proposal, or in other words, the percentage of requests the agency favorably 
responded to in each subsection of the rule. These regressions provide information regarding 
agency bias towards particular types of commenters, and how factors such as the consistency and 
number of commenters within a proposal affect rule outcomes.  
 In the following sections, I describe the rulemaking environment in the finance and 
healthcare sectors leading up to and immediately after Dodd-Frank and the ACA that make these 
laws and their related rules meaningful case studies. After that, I summarize the current literature 
on interest groups and the bureaucracy and theorize how public service agencies fit into current 
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theories. I then present an overview of the hypotheses, data, and methods that were used to 
collect, code, and analyze the data from the final rules and comments. Finally, I discuss the 
results from the data and suggest implications for future research and public policy.  
 
Background on Dodd-Frank and the Affordable Care Act 
 
Early into President Obama’s first term, work on the Affordable Care Act began while 
the country dealt simultaneously with the deepest financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
Though these events impacted different industries, they both would result in regulatory 
overhauls. By 2010, the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Act were signed into law. As 
major pieces of legislation, these laws required significant changes and additions to existing 
rules. Consequently, both laws were heavily lobbied by interests, and many of those interests 
continued lobbying throughout the rulemaking process. However, to understand how these 
interests were affected, it is important to examine the previous regulatory landscapes in the 
finance and healthcare sectors. 
Dodd-Frank upended a decades long pattern of deregulation in finance. Starting in the 
1980s, financial regulators began deregulating the financial industry right as the industry was 
taking off. Banks became bigger, investments became riskier, and the finance sector’s share of 
the economy grew tremendously (Hacker and Pierson 2007; Sherman 2009; Buffie 2016).  
Because of the lax regulation, the finance industry profited from policy drift as old statutes failed 
to regulate new products like collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps1, and the 
regulatory agencies chose to let the banks, credit rating agencies, and market makers regulate 
themselves (See Commodity Futures Modernization Act and Voluntary Regulation Program at 
the SEC; Labaton 2008; Brush 2008; Sherman 2009). Agency capture followed suit as new laws 
such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 were enacted that allowed banks to merge 
commercial, investment, and insurance branches into one bank, while the regulatory agencies 
allowed for negligent industry developments. These policies fostered incentives to acquire short-
term gains and make questionable decisions leading to systemic risk in the market. Then in 2008, 
that risk became reality when the stock market crashed, and the US economy sunk into The 
Great Recession. This prompted the government to create and pass the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, which restructured the regulatory agencies and 
pushed for increased accountability and transparency.  
As a result of Dodd-Frank, the Securities and Exchange Commission along with other 
financial regulators were tasked with creating specific regulations to provide more oversight of 
asset-backed securities, credit rating agencies, and credit default swaps, which were all complicit 
in the financial crisis. Wilson (1989) defines bureaucracies like the SEC as entrepreneurial 
agencies in which interests are hostile to the mission of the agency. For this reason, the SEC’s 
unique positioning as a low salience bureaucracy among the general public coupled with a well-
connected and resourceful industry clientele make it a perfect example of “the regulatory 
bureaucracy” subject to agency capture (Nixon, Howard, DeWitt 2002; Macey 2010).    
                                                          
1 Collateralized debt obligations are financial products in which individual debts (car loans, mortgages, credit card 
debt, etc.) are aggregated and sold as securities to investors who receive payments based on the riskiness of the debt. 
Credit default swaps allow entities to “swap” various debts, interest rates, currencies, etc. through an intermediary 
eliminating the possibility of bilateral defaults. These relatively modern and advanced financial products contributed 
to the financial crises due to lax oversight of the riskiness of these products. 
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Furthermore, the SEC was one of the most affected agencies by Dodd-Frank because the 
law required the SEC to publish 86 rules, some of which brought previously unregulated entities 
into the SEC’s domain (Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act 2016). With the threat of costly regulation looming, financial industries and trade 
associations increased their lobbying activity (Igan, Mishra, and Tressel 2012). Financial 
contributions to campaigns nearly doubled during this period, and undoubtedly, industries 
pushed their influence onto bureaucrats (Center for Responsive Politics 2016). The SEC’s 
predisposition to agency capture and the looming costs for financial firms made these rules 
especially susceptible to a bias towards business.  
The Affordable Care Act shook the healthcare industry just as Dodd-Frank affected the 
financial industry. However, the ACA was not passed in response to an unexpected industry 
crisis. The issues in the healthcare market including rising premiums and under coverage were 
well known years in advance, but finding a solution to these problems required overcoming 
political obstacles. The groundwork for healthcare reform began in the Clinton administration, 
which proposed a bill requiring employers to provide healthcare to employees through health 
maintenance organizations (Health Security Act 1993).  However, negative advertising funded 
by conservative groups eventually prevented President Clinton’s bill from passing due to 
concerns of complexity (Hacker 2008; McKay and Clark 2009). Republicans attempted to 
propose alternative bills requiring that individuals, not employers, purchase health care through 
individual mandates, but these bills failed to pass as well (Mckay and Clark 2009). Nevertheless, 
the groundwork for reform was laid. Massachusetts was the first state to enact some of these 
provisions including an individual mandate and a state insurance exchange in 2006, which would 
later appear in the ACA (An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health 
Care 2006).  
By 2008, health care reform became a top political issue, and once President Obama was 
elected, the groundwork for the ACA was set in motion. Partisanship was a major obstacle, but 
eventually, the law was passed in 2010 on party lines. The law completely reshaped the 
healthcare industry. It expanded coverage through Medicaid, individual mandates, government 
subsidies, and insurance exchanges in addition to cutting health care costs through various cost 
programs and premium stabilization rules (Baker 2011). These considerable reforms impacted 
health care providers, insurers, and millions of healthcare consumers including employers who 
had significant stakes in the outcome of the law.  
HHS was tasked with implementing the law, which included a variety of rules related to 
setting up federally facilitated health care exchanges, expanding healthcare coverage rules, and 
providing reinsurance payment and reporting requirements. In this case, the rules served to help 
administer and provide a public service rather than to regulate an industry. 
 In contrast to the SEC, HHS works in a high salience environment full of resourceful 
industry and consumer advocates all competing for favorable outcomes. Additionally, there are 
costs and benefits that are both dispersed and concentrated across various stakeholders. For 
example, covering pre-existing conditions leads to concentrated benefits for individuals with 
those conditions, but dispersed costs for insurers and all those in the insurance pool. 
Alternatively, the individual mandate, which requires individuals without health insurance to pay 
a tax, is a dispersed benefit for insurers who need to maintain premium costs, but a concentrated 
cost on those who do not have insurance. Therefore, regulations which include many specific 
proposals can elicit comments from many interested parties possibly diluting the influence of any 
one group of commenters. Wilson (1989) refers to this type of agency as an interest-group 
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agency where both high per-capita costs and high per-capita benefits are produced resulting in 
agency bias towards whichever side is most active in the debate. 
 Furthermore, because many of HHS’ proposals deal directly with tangible benefits, HHS 
receives many requests to increase benefits rather than reduce costs, which also distinguishes it 
from the SEC.  An agency will have less incentive to change a proposal if it will cost the agency 
money. The complex and dynamic nature of these comments and commenters likely results in 
HHS being unbiased towards any specific commenter (Olson 1965; Wilson 1989). Previously, 
very few studies have attempted to test this claim about public service agencies.  
 
Interests Groups and the Bureaucracy 
In America’s pluralist democracy, there are many venues to sway leaders beyond casting 
a simple vote (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Interest groups have developed expertise in 
infiltrating these avenues and use them to their advantage. They provide information to 
policymakers, mobilize communities to act, and fund political campaigns, all of which change 
policy outcomes. This can oftentimes be healthy in a democracy since interest groups help 
invoke change, but when interests are disproportionate in resources, there is need for concern. 
Wealthier, more resourceful interests, like big business and powerful membership-based groups, 
can overwhelm majority preferences even when they are in the minority (Baumgartner and 
Leech 1998, 2001; Yackee and Yackee 2006). Likewise, grant recipients have been shown to 
skew the distribution of government funds and services through lobbying efforts (Arnold 1979; 
Rich 1989). Therefore, studying the role of these groups in the policymaking process can help 
inform policymakers, politicians, and the public when interests are out of balance.  
An abundant literature exists on the influence of interests on Congress, the presidency, 
and the courts. These studies have explained the avenues of influence and empirical studies have 
shown their effects. Previous research has shown that Congress is influenced through campaign 
contributions, informal issue networks, and lobbying (Smith 1984; Edsall 1988; Austin-Smith 
and Wright 1992; Smith 1995; Bonica, Igan, Mishra, and Tressel 2012; McCarthy, Poole, and 
Rosenthal 2013). Though theories have changed over time in regards to the magnitude of 
influence, most scholars agree that interests have some control over Congress. The presidency 
also is increasingly reliant on campaign contributions and frequently works with interest groups. 
Additionally, the presidency and executive branch officials often maintain networks with interest 
groups for consensus building and outreach (Scholzmann and Tierney 1986; Peterson 1992; 
Straus 2009). Finally, courts, though seemingly apolitical at the federal level, often are persuaded 
by amicus curiae briefs, especially those that come from the presidency’s administration, which 
in turn, diminishes the credibility of the courts as neutral arbiters of the law (Caldeira and Wright 
1988, 1990; Epstein 1994; McGuire 1998; Collins 2007). 
While these studies made great strides in interest group research, they tend to omit one 
important and often overlooked branch of the government: the bureaucracy. The bureaucracies 
do more work than any other branch of government. They write and promulgate rules to 
implement laws and presidential directives, allocate federal grants and contracts, and enforce 
regulations often using their own administrative law courts (Kerwin 2007). These tasks are not 
minor affairs either. In 2014, over 75,000 pages of regulations were published and reports have 
shown that administrative law courts are becoming more common venues for court cases 
compared to federal courts (Choi, Gilley, and Marcus 2016; Eaglesham 2015; Regulatory Studies 
Center 2016). This makes the bureaucracies a very vital and significant part of the American 
government, and for that reason, they are exposed to many interests in addition to their political 
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overseers. Despite this, very few studies have examined these relationships and fewer have used 
empirical data.  
It is well known that the bureaucracies are agents of the Presidency, Congress, and the 
Courts (Strauss 1984; Wilson 1989; Moe 1989). However, in addition to these principals, 
regulatory bureaucracies directly interact with interest groups and other external actors as well 
(Reenock and Gerber 2008). Kerwin, Furlong, and West (2010) proposed three traditional 
avenues of direct influence on bureaucracies. These are the agenda setting stage, the pre-proposal 
stage, and the comment-making stage. In addition, the enforcement behavior of bureaucracies 
can also can be influenced by interests. Figure 1 describes this process.  
 
Figure 1: Overview of the Rulemaking Process 
 
 
 
In the agenda setting stage, bureaucracies set the agenda for the rules they plan to 
publish. Kerwin, Furlong, and West (2010) argue that there exist informal networks among 
leaders of the bureaucracies and interests that help to alter the agenda setting stage. Since grant 
recipients and business interests are immediately affected by regulation, they likely play a 
significant role in setting the agenda for new regulations when regulations are unclear or 
practices change (West and Raso 2013). Furthermore, members of Congress likely influence this 
stage as well by advocating on behalf of certain interest groups (Wilson 1989; West and Raso 
2013).  
The next stage of influence is the pre-proposal stage. In the pre-proposal stage, 
bureaucracies draft rules. When doing so, it is not uncommon for them to reach out to their 
industry clientele or consumer interest groups to determine what standards are appropriate in 
order to follow the objectives of their principals while also not imposing undue burdens on those 
they regulate (West 2004). Though this is an important and even necessary step, the extent of 
change that occurs during this period is relatively unknown among political scientists and public 
1. Agenda
Setting Stage
-Agencies determine 
if a rule is needed 
based on executive 
objectives, new laws, 
or other initiating 
events and when 
work will begin on 
the rule. 
2. Pre-Proposal 
Stage
-Agencies draft the 
rule to be reviewed 
by OMB. 
-Outreach to industry 
groups for input 
occurs during this 
stage as well. 
-Proposed rules
generally include 
request for public 
comments on aspects 
of the rule.
3. Notice and 
Comment 
-Under the APA, 
agencies must 
allow time for the 
public to submit 
comments to be 
reveiwed by the 
agency. Typically, 
the public has 60 
days to comment.
-Certain rules may 
be exempt from 
this process. 
4. Final rule 
Publication
-After the agencies 
review public 
comments, they 
make edits to the 
proposed rule and 
publish the final 
rule with responses 
to comments.  
-The final rule 
could also be an 
interim final rule 
which requests 
more comments.
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administration scholars. However, many expect this influence to be significant (West 2004; 
Yackee 2012).  
After the proposed rule is published, there is a period of time for interested parties to 
submit comments to request changes or offer support. This period is known as the notice-and-
comment period and is the focus of this thesis. During this period, the general public attempts to 
change portions of the rule and prepare for any regulatory changes that will affect them. Once 
the comment period ends, the bureaucracy must review all the comments and summarize them in 
the final report. Any changes they make to the rule, must be noted as well. This requirement is 
mandated by the Administrative Procedures Act, and any failure to address this rule can result in 
judicial review. Furlong (1997, 1998) has determined that this is the most common form of 
participation in agency rulemaking.   
Lastly, the final rule is published. It is generally reviewed by the Office of Management 
and Budget and Congress for final approval. Typically, the final rule goes into effect 30 days 
after publication, or 60 days thereafter, if the rule is deemed significant. Once the rule is in 
effect, bureaucracies will often enforce the rule themselves. Just like federal prosecutors, the 
bureaucracies have a lot of discretion to decide which cases to pursue and what charges or 
damages to claim (Park 2012; Eaglesham 2014). This discretion may lead to potential biases 
between regulated entities. For example, the SEC often allows those they prosecute to pay fines 
without admitting guilt, which is a discretionary choice on their part (Eaglesham and Ackerman 
2013). The reasoning behind this, however, remains opaque. More research is needed to discover 
any effects of this bias.  
As noted, this thesis focuses specifically on the notice-and-comment period. Though 
interest groups may exert significant influence during the pre-proposal and agenda setting stages, 
the notice-and-comment period provides observable changes from the submission of comments 
due to the Administrative Procedures Act. This allows for better data and empirical analysis. 
Despite this, few studies have looked at how comment submissions have affected agency 
rulemaking behavior. Studies that have approached this topic made important strides in creating 
methodology for analysis, yet most cover a wide range of regulatory agencies without focusing 
on specific regulated industries or significant regulatory events or time periods.  
Golden (1998) conducted a descriptive study of comment letters of National Highway 
Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA), Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This study concluded that there was 
no discernable influence on the agencies from any particular type of commenter. While this 
study provided a framework for studying comment letters and comparing different types of 
agencies, it was limited mostly to descriptive analysis. Furthermore, the rules studied were all 
“typical rules” rather than salient rules to determine who participates in an average rule-making 
procedure. 
Yackee and Yackee (2006) used comment letters to analyze 30 different rules over a 
period of 7 years to determine if a bias towards business exists in responding to comments. 
Previous literature suggests that businesses enjoy an advantage in the policymaking process 
(Schlozman and Tierny 1986; Baumgartner and Leech 1998). They find that business interests do 
have more potential to change regulation with consistency and strength in numbers. However, by 
focusing on the influence of business commenters on agencies that generally regulate businesses, 
Yackee and Yackee (2006) are not able to compare how different types of agencies, especially 
those that provide services, are influenced by different types of commenters such as consumer 
groups. Additionally, they attempt to study “average” rules instead of rules published during 
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periods of regulatory change. While there is merit to understanding a baseline level of influence 
over time, studying the extent to which commenters can influence bureaucracies by looking at 
high salience rules where industries undergo more intense lobbying efforts is also important. 
Nixon, Howard and DeWitt (2002), instead of looking at actual comment letters, 
reviewed mentions of comments within final rules published by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1998. This method allows for a much more nuanced analysis because the 
mentions in the rule are linked directly to the agency’s response. Furthermore, the APA requires 
federal agencies to review and respond to all comments, so the mentions of comments in the rule 
should be representative of the actual comment letters. The study found that business interests 
had no discernable advantages and that increased numbers of commenters did not increase the 
likelihood of rule changes, likely due to the SEC’s bureaucratic expertise and culture of 
protecting investors. 
While these previous studies and many others have made important contributions to the 
literature on interest group influence, they have focused almost exclusively on regulatory 
agencies that impose regulatory costs on businesses. This is likely because many organized 
interests tend to be business interests trying to reduce regulatory burdens by submitting 
comments that oppose strict regulation. However, not all regulations are intended to stymie 
business in the interest of the public. Many regulations dictate the rules which determine how 
public services are allocated and administered by federal agencies such as those distributed by 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Education, and of 
course, the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Much like with grant-making, Congress will provide an authorization and a general 
outline for the provision of public goods, but bureaucrats will fill out the eligibility criteria and 
allocation mechanisms through the rulemaking process (Rich 1989). This level of decision-
making makes it worthwhile for service/good-recipients to focus their lobbying efforts on 
bureaucracies in addition to Congress. Previous research has shown that grant recipients with 
experience in grant writing, lobbyists, or offices dedicated to writing grant applications are more 
effective in receiving grants (Peliserro and England 1980; Cingranelli 1984). It is not a far stretch 
to imagine that these experienced players also evaluate and participate in the rulemaking process 
administering these programs.  
 Rules regarding public services often fall into two categories. The first category includes 
eligibility criteria and allocation procedures. These types of regulations determine who receives 
public benefits. For example, allocation could be based on “fair share” systems where money is 
allocated evenly or “worst first” type systems where money is distributed to the beneficiaries 
most in need (Chubb 1985). Additionally, certain criteria are often imposed on providers such as 
using only American goods to supply the benefits (Wilson 1989).  
The second category is reporting requirements. These rules determine the types of 
reporting, both programmatic and financial, that the recipient must adhere to. They may also 
include auditing requirements and on-site visits depending on the program (Grants.gov n.d.). 
Both types of regulation can affect who will receive money and what costs they will bear if they 
do receive it. Therefore, many potential service/good recipients organize to lobby rules through 
the rulemaking process. 
One way in which these organizations can lobby federal agencies to alter these rules is 
through comment submissions as previously discussed. Organizations that submit comments for 
these types of rules are trying to make the regulatory environment for acquiring funding or 
providing services more favorable instead of trying to reduce regulatory costs as business 
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interests often do. In the case of HHS, stakeholders often submit comments to expand eligibility 
criteria or reduce costs associated with providing healthcare. 
 
Hypotheses 
 Bureaucrats likely consider several factors when deciding to change a proposed rule 
based on comments. For the most part, they probably review the merits of a comment and the 
evidence supporting the commenter’s position. However, other factors may be at play too. I 
expect that bureaucrats also consider attributes of the comments and the commenters themselves 
to determine which positions to align with. These attributes could include the type of commenter, 
previous relationships with the commenter, the number of commenters on a proposal, and the 
overall consistency of commenters positions. Previous research has tested these claims for 
regulatory bureaucracies and found that these types of attributes are statistically significant 
predictors of rule changes or outcomes (Golden 1998; Nixon, Howard, and DeWitt 2002; Yackee 
and Yackee 2006; Shapiro 2008). 
 Furthermore, since the SEC and HHS are different types of bureaucracies, they may also 
exhibit different types of bias. Since HHS acts as a public service provider, their comment letters 
and the agency responses to them may actually be quite different than those of the SEC. They are 
likely to include a broader range of commenter types since the ACA affected a broader range of 
stakeholders, and this may make HHS less receptive to any one type of commenter or perhaps 
more receptive to commenters outside of business interests. Based on this, I have developed five 
hypotheses to test which factors result in favorable outcomes for the commenters. Favorable 
outcomes are defined as an agency response that aligns with the commenter’s request to either 
keep the rule the same or change the rule. 
 
H1: More frequent commenters have more success achieving favorable outcomes 
Commenters who have sustained relationships with an agency probably have more 
influence when writing comments, since the agencies regularly work with these 
commenters and may even know individuals within the rulemaking agencies. Previous 
literature has suggested experienced grant writing agencies and agencies with more grant-
writing resources are more successful in receiving federal funds (Peliserro and England 
1980). If this is true, then it is also reasonable to think that recipients with a history of 
commenting and ties to the agency may be more effective in changing proposed rules. 
 
H2: More privileged commenters have more success achieving favorable outcomes 
Some categorical characteristics of the commenters may impact their influence such as 
their resources, expertise, and name recognition. For this reason, comments from trade 
associations, corporations, consumer advocate organizations, and states likely have more 
influence because these types of commenters have more resources, name recognition, and 
stakes in the rule outcomes than individuals or small entities. 
 
H3: Number of comments increases the likelihood of favorable outcomes 
If the number of commenters on a proposal increases, the attention directed towards that 
proposal should also increase, thus increasing the likelihood of a change (Shapiro 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
H4: Consistency of comments increases the likelihood of favorable outcomes 
As the percentage of commenters opposed to a rule increases, the agency may be more 
incentivized to change the rule due to a general consensus on the proposal and vice versa. 
 
H5: The SEC responds more favorably to interests than HHS 
Because the SEC generally writes rules imposing concentrated costs on the financial 
industry with dispersed benefits for the general public, they are more likely to suffer from 
agency capture than HHS, which has a much more dynamic cost/benefit relationship with 
stakeholders reducing the impact of any one particular commenter. Furthermore, HHS 
likely receives more comments asking for an expansion of their services, but they may 
have less incentive to do so due to budget constraints. This means that they may be less 
likely to produce favorable outcomes among all commenters. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
To test these hypothesis, I look at the mentions of comments within the final rules 
published by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the actual comments submitted to the 
Department of Health and Human Services. The scope of data was limited to rules published in 
the 113th session of Congress to control for any general differences that may exist over time due 
to changes in government officials and staff.  
To determine the impact of organized interests on the SEC, final rules on Dodd-Frank 
published by the SEC in 2014 were reviewed. Consistent with Nixon, Howard, and DeWitt 
(2002) and Golden (1998), I restricted the study to one year of observations so that all rules were 
published under the same administration and SEC leadership. The SEC commissioners at the 
time were all appointed in 2013 and served throughout 2014. There were fourteen rules that were 
published in 2014, and seven of these rules requested comment submissions. Of these, three were 
coded and included in the study. Those that were excluded either did not include specific data 
regarding who the commenters were or contained too many comment mentions to code within 
the time frame of this study. With the remaining data, I coded 923 comment mentions within the 
final published rules.  
Within these rules, there were generally subsections containing specific proposals. These 
proposals explained the proposed portion of the rule, provided an overview of the comments 
received on the proposal, and described the SEC’s responses to the comments. Each of these 
proposals served as a broader unit of analysis for the individual comment mentions.  
The proposals provided a very detailed analysis of the comments received. The SEC 
would typically mention how many commenters supported and opposed the proposal and then go 
into more detail about certain comments that were more specific and salient to the issue. The 
SEC included both comments that persuaded them to change the rule and comments they 
disagreed with. Figure 2 provides an excerpt from a proposal with comment mentions and the 
agency’s response from the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization Rule 
published by the SEC that proposes separating sales and marketing functions of credit rating 
agencies from their ratings functions. 
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Figure 2: Excerpt from a Proposal in the Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization Rule Published by the SEC 
 
 
 
Magat, Krupnick, and Harrington (1986) in a study on EPA regulations made the 
conclusion that major points in the original comments appear to be well represented in the 
Federal Register, so comment mentions are a useful proxy for actual comment letters, but can 
serve as more granular data when determining the specific changes made in response to 
comments. From a general overview, it appeared the SEC fairly represented commenters’ letters 
throughout the final regulations. In one rule, virtually all commenters were mentioned in the 
comment mentions while the other rules hovered around seventy-five percent representation in 
the mentions (Since comments often express very general positions or are not germane to the 
rule, usually not all comments will be referred to). Though this a crude measure, it indicates that 
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the agencies’ comment mentions in the final rule are a useful proxy for the actual requests 
located in the comments. 
Each comment mention almost always contained a footnote listing the specific 
commenters referenced and an explanation of the comment’s content. This information was used 
to code the commenter name, type, and position. Only comment mentions that included a 
position on the proposal were included in the coding. To give an example, a comment mention 
such as “we received 10 comments based on this request” or “commenters asked for clarification 
on this issue” were not included because they did not express a particular position on the issue. 
However, comment mentions that indicated general support or opposition to the proposal were 
included as were more detailed comment mentions that included a description of the comment’s 
reasoning and position. 
  For each comment mention, I coded the proposed regulation, the rule, the number of 
commenters determined by the referenced comments in the footnotes, the comment position 
measured by support or opposition to the current proposal, whether the comment mention 
included evidence or reasoning to support the comment position, who the commenters were, the 
type of commenter, whether or not the SEC changed the rule in the direction the commenter 
wanted or did not change the rule, and the text of the comment mention.  
To analyze the impact of commenters on the Department of Health and Human Services, 
actual comment letters were used instead of comment mentions in the final rules. Though the 
Department of Health and Human Services referenced comments throughout the final rule, it did 
not specify who the commenters were. Therefore, actual comment letters were coded to gather 
this data. This methodology aligns more closely with the Yackee and Yackee (2006) study 
previously mentioned. The coding from both methodologies should yield comparable data given 
that comment mentions accurately represent the underlying comment letters as previously 
mentioned, and both the comment mentions in the final rule and requests within the comments 
themselves are similar units of analysis.  
Three of the published HHS regulations in the period from 2013-2014 were coded and 
analyzed for commenter type. All of these rules were published under the same leadership at the 
Department of Health and Human Services and under the same administration. Rules that were 
specific to one topic were dropped in order to keep the analysis broad in scope. Only one rule, 
however, was coded for comment requests and agency responses due to the significant time 
involved in coding the actual comments. However, the complexity of the rule and diverse set of 
commenters allowed for a robust analysis. 755 comment requests were coded for 395 
commenters. Many of these comments included individuals requesting an extension of the 
comment period, which was 30 days instead of the usual 60. There were also many commenters 
with substantive and specific comments. Overall, the rule was broad enough in scope that it 
attracted a variety of commenters on 83 different proposals to analyze. Figure 3 is a snapshot of 
an electronic comment letter requesting an extension of the comment period. Other comments 
included attachments with multiple pages of specific requests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Figure 3: An Example Comment Request from the Payment Parameters Rule Published by  
HHS 
 
 
The structure of the rules themselves were very similar to the SEC regulations. They 
included a subsection of the rule asking for comments on a specific proposal, explained any 
changes that were adopted in the final rule, and addressed and responded to the comments they 
received. For each comment, the specific requests of the commenters were coded. I refer to these 
as comment requests. Based on the context of the request in the comment, the corresponding 
proposal could be located in the final rule and a determination could be made as to whether or 
not the final rule was changed in response to the request. For example, if a commenter requested 
in a comment letter that an employer should not have to offer multiple health plan variations on a 
federally facilitated exchange, that request could be traced back to a proposal in the final rule, 
and the rule would almost always address the specific request with a response. For commenters 
that did not refer to a specific portion of the rule, I coded the request as a general category rather 
than a specific proposal. Additionally, I did not code requests that simply asked for clarification 
or additional information on an issue to be consistent with the SEC data.  
For each comment request, I coded the the rule, the comment position measured by 
support or opposition to the current proposal, whether the comment request included evidence or 
reasoning to support the comment position, who the commenters were, the type of commenter, 
whether or not HHS changed the rule in the direction the commenter wanted or did not change 
the rule, and the text of the comment request and HHS response. Table 1 includes an overview of 
the rules that were coded for the SEC and HHS, and Table 2 is a summary of the variables that 
were coded. These include dummy variables for favorable outcomes, evidence provided, 
frequent (repeat) commenters, and various types of commenters.  
  
TABLE 1: Overview of Rules Studied 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency Regulation Name Date Published Topic Number of comment Letters* Rule Proposals 
% commenters requesting changes                                              
(% Rule Changes in Response to Requests)
SEC
Application of “Security-Based Swap 
Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap 
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border 
Security-Based Swap Activities; 
Republication
9/8/2014
Establishes new regualtions for "security-
based swap dealers" and "major security-
based swap participants"
36 14
SEC
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations
9/15/2014
Establishes new regulations for Statistical 
Rating Organizations 
67 13
SEC
Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and 
Registration
9/24/2014
Disclosure, reporting, registration, and 
offering processes for asset backed securities
250 30
HHS
Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment 
Parameters for 2014
8/12/2014
Fees for federal exchanges and national 
reinsuarance programs; conditions for plans 
and states to set up exchanges
420 83
79% Requests Requesting Changes                                            
(17% Changes in Response to Requests)     
HHS
Medicaid Program; Increased Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage Changes 
Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010
4/2/2013
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage rates 
certain populations under states' Medicaid 
programs
813 N/A N/A
HHS
Basic Health Program: State 
Administration of Basic Health Programs; 
Eligibility and Enrollment in Standard 
Health Plans; Essential Health Benefits in 
Standard Health Plans; Performance 
Standards for Basic Health Programs; 
Premium and Cost Sharing for Basic Health 
Programs; Federal Funding Process; Trust 
Fund and Financial Integrity
3/12/2014
Regulations regarding the setup and 
operations of Basic Health Programs 
including transfer of funds to participating 
states and federal oversight
168 N/A N/A
*The number of comment letters posted on regulations.gov and the SEC website varied from the stated number of comments received in the final rule.
76%  Requesting Changes                                                                                 
(36% Changes in Response to Requests)
Table 2: Summary Statistics2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 See Appendix for an overview of the coding methodology for these variables. 
Obs Percentage Std. Dev Obs Percentage Std. Dev
Favorable Response 464 47.0% 0.500 885 56.0% 0.500
Evidence 744 40.0% 0.490 888 70.0% 0.460
Repeat Commenter 755 15.8% 0.365 923 48.3% 0.500
Association 755 9.1% 0.288 923 40.2% 0.491
Consumer Group 755 10.3% 0.305 923 73.0% 0.260
Government 755 6.1% 0.239 923 1.4% 0.118
Industry 755 6.2% 0.242 923 51.2% 0.500
Individidual 755 31.1% 0.463 923 6.5% 0.247
International 923 2.8% 0.166
Academic 755 3.7% 0.189
Legal 755 0.9% 0.096
Health Care Industry 755 25.2% 0.434
HHS Variables SEC Variables
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Results 
 
The data yielded a number of interesting findings, both descriptively and statistically, 
regarding commenter positions, agency responses, the distribution of commenters, agency bias, 
and the effect of commenter consistency on rules. The contrast between the SEC and HHS was 
substantial based on these metrics as well. 
As previously mentioned, Table 1 displays the rules that were coded and a brief overview 
of each rule. The number of comments per rule ranged from 36 to 813. There were generally 
more commenters on HHS rules compared to the SEC rules, which is expected considering HHS 
has a broader range of stakeholders. Within each rule, the number of proposals ranged from 13 to 
83, so all the rules covered a variety of specific proposals.  
Overall, 76% of comment mentions on the SEC rules did not support the rule. In response 
to the requests, however, only 36% of the requests resulted in a rule change indicating that a little 
under half the requests for changes resulted in favorable outcomes. 79% of comment requests did 
not support HHS rules, which was surprisingly very similar to the SEC statistic. HHS,  
however, only responded to 17% of these requests; about half the response rate of the SEC, 
indicating that HHS is generally less likely to make changes to their rules. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that as a public service agency, more requests involve expanding or increasing 
services, which would increase government spending, thus limiting the agency’s ability to 
produce favorable outcomes for commenters. It is also possible that with a more robust interest 
group environment fighting over different outcomes, HHS may feel less pressure to change their 
rules.  
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show how the interest group environments differ among HHS and 
SEC commenters. Overall, these distributions of commenters are consistent with the stakeholders 
of each agency. The SEC generally regulates businesses in the financial industry, so financial 
industry commenters and financial companies make up the majority of commenters. Industry and 
trade association commenters are the top commenter types, but individuals comment frequently 
as well. HHS creates rules that govern the implementation of health care services that affect 
insurers, health care professionals, states, employers, and individuals, and consequently, this 
broad array of stakeholders is reflected in the distribution of HHS commenters. Individuals, 
consumer advocates, and government entities comment the most frequently followed by various 
stakeholders in the healthcare industry.  
There is some variation within the rules as well indicating that different rules attract 
different types of commenters. For instance, the SEC rule on security-based swaps drew in a lot 
of international commenters such as European and Japanese financial associations. Currencies 
can be traded in the swap markets so that could explain the spike in international commenters. 
Similarly, the Payment Parameters Program rule attracted many individual commenters and 
fewer government commenters compared to other rules. This rule established user fees for 
federally facilitated exchanges and helped to establish reinsurance, premium tax credit, and cost 
sharing reductions which affected the individual market for health care consumers. Many of the 
individual commenters on this rule were asking for an extension of the comment period from 30 
to 60 days. Mass comments by individuals like these frequently appeared in the HHS rules which 
helps to explain why there were so many individual commenters. In general, commenters tend to 
focus their comments on rules that will have a direct effect on them. 
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Figure 4.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
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Some commenters, however, seem to reappear from rule to rule in both agencies. 
WellPoint, Community Catalyst, Federation of American Hospitals, and Families USA 
commented on all three HHS rules. The American Bar Association, Americans for Financial 
Reform, American Securitization Forum, and a few others commented on all of the SEC rules. 
Repeat commenters are significant because if an organization frequently comments, an agency 
may trust that commenter more and pay closer attention to their requests. The SEC had more 
repeat commenters and a higher proportion of repeat commenters overall. 48% of comment 
mentions across the three SEC rules came from commenters who commented on 2 or more of 
those rules, whereas only 15.8% of HHS comment requests came from commenters who 
comment on 2 or more rules (See Table 2: Summary Statistics). This is a striking statistic 
indicating that the SEC has a larger base of frequent commenters. Because these commenters are 
consistently participating in the rulemaking process, it is possible that the SEC tends to favor 
their requests over others. The following model tests this claim. 
Table 3 is a linear probability model using OLS that assesses how particular types of 
commenters, comment requests that include evidence (a dummy variable for data or relevant 
information provided with a request), and repeat commenters (a dummy variable for commenters 
that comment on two or more rules) affect favorable outcomes. Favorable outcomes are a binary 
variable measured by agency responses adhering to commenter requests. For example, if a 
comment request supported a proposal and the agency kept the rule the same, this would be 
coded as a 1 for a favorable outcome. If the agency changed the rule, a 0 was coded. Similarly, if 
a comment request or mention asked for a change to the proposal, and the agency changed the 
proposal accordingly, this was coded as a 1 for a favorable outcome. If the agency did not 
change the rule or changed the rule in a opposite direction to the request, this was coded as a 0. 
Two models were created; one for HHS and one for the SEC. The HHS model uses data from 
specific comments whereas the SEC model uses data from comment mentions in the final rule. 
 Though the model is not particularly sophisticated, it allows a simple distinction to be 
made about agency bias towards particular types of commenters and is easy to interpret as 
opposed to a logit or probit model. As a result, the model is not a great predictor of rule 
outcomes with an R-squared of about 9% for HHS and 2% for the SEC. But for a model using 
predominantly agency type to explain favorable outcomes, this is expected. Robust standard 
errors were also used to address heteroskedasticity in the model. Overall, both models were 
statistically significant. 
For HHS, consumer groups and academics have statistically significant and positive 
correlations with favorable outcomes. If a comment request comes from a consumer group, the 
probability that there will be favorable outcome (favorable outcome =1) increases by 21%, and if 
a comment request comes from an academic, the probability of a favorable outcome increases by 
23%. This is substantial premium on favorable outcomes for these types of commenters. Why 
this is the case is difficult to discern. It is possible that HHS may have a culture favoring the 
beneficiaries of its services rather than the industry it regulates. Academics may also provide a 
source of impartial opinions that HHS values. More tailored analyses are needed to determine the 
exact casual mechanism. Either way, these results indicate that the hypothesis that HHS will not 
be biased towards any particular commenter is incorrect. 
Alternatively, government and individual commenters do not seem to achieve favorable 
results with HHS. If a comment request comes from a government commenter, the probability of 
a favorable outcome decreases by about 24%, and comments coming from individuals decrease 
the probability of a favorable outcome by a striking 39%. This is likely due to the fact individual 
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comments are less sophisticated and more general than other comments. Government 
commenters may not have as much success with HHS because state governments and local 
governments are less supportive of proposals. Only 10% of government commenters support rule 
proposals, and because HHS, overall, is unlikely to change a proposal, government commenters 
have worse outcomes. Other types of commenters did not produce statistically significant results 
perhaps because of the diverse set of opinions among the health care industry, associations, and 
business commenters leading to mixed results at the commenter type level. 
 In the SEC model, trade associations and industry commenters have statistically 
significant and positive correlations with favorable outcomes.  This could possibly be due to the 
concentration and similarities of these interests acting on the SEC compared to HHS. If a 
commenter is an association, the probability of a favorable outcome increases by about 10%. 
Likewise, if a commenter is an industry commenter, the probability of a favorable outcome 
increases by about 9%. Though these magnitudes are relatively small, the results seem to support 
the hypothesis that the SEC exhibits a bias towards business. 
Frequent commenters did not produce statistically significant results which seems to 
suggest that commenters who consistently comment on rules do not have a per se advantage over 
other commenters. Additionally, evidence does not have a statistically significant effect in the 
SEC model, but does a have a statistically significant and negative correlation with favorable 
outcomes in the HHS model. Evidence is a dummy variable that measures the inclusion of data, 
examples, or extensive reasoning in a comment request or mention. Because of the simplicity of 
the measure, it is difficult to discern why this may be. It is possible that commenters citing 
evidence generally disagree with a proposal, and because HHS rarely changes their rules, there is 
a negative correlation. 
The second model averages the favorable outcome data at the proposal level. The 
dependent variable is the percentage of favorable outcomes, and the dependent variables are the 
percentage of commenters supporting the proposal (Average Position), the average number of 
commenters providing evidence (Average Evidence), and the total number of commenters on the 
proposal (Number of Commenters). For the SEC data, the variables are weighted to account for 
the number of commenters on each comment proposal since a comment mention can reference 
multiple commenters. In other words, with the weighting, the dependent variable measuring 
support is the percentage of commenters supporting the proposal rather than the percentage of 
comment mentions supporting the proposal. The results are presented in Table 4.  
For both agencies, a higher percentage of commenters supporting a proposal is 
statistically significant and results in higher average favorable outcomes. For every 10% increase 
in the percentage of commenters supporting the rule, there is an 7-8% increase in the percentage 
of favorable outcomes. Evidence is only statistically significant in the HHS model. A 10% 
increase in the percentage of comment requests with evidence results in a 3.3% increase in the 
percentage of favorable outcomes. Evidence is likely not significant for the SEC comment 
mentions because for the SEC data, the evidence variable was coded when the agency relayed 
that evidence in the final rule, not in the actual comment. That may have limited the true effect 
evidence in an actual comment may have had. Additionally, the number of commenters on a 
proposal was significant for the SEC, but did not make a meaningful difference to the percentage 
of favorable outcomes. This indicates that neither agency responds favorably to commenters 
based on the salience of the proposal measured by the number of commenters. 
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Table 3: Regression Results for Agency Bias 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HHS Results SEC Results
Favorable Outcome* Favorable Outcome*
Evidence -0.088 -0.019
(0.049)* (0.038)
Repeat Commenter 0.005 0.041
(0.056) (0.038)
Individidual -0.393 0.024
(0.106)** (0.073)
Association 0.064 0.095
(0.105) (0.044)**
Consumer Group 0.208 -0.093
(0.095)** (0.073)
Government -0.235 0.169
(0.106)** (0.146)
Industry -0.126 0.087
(0.110) (0.043)**
Health Care Industry 0.010
(0.089)
Academic 0.234
(0.127)*
Legal -0.087
(0.213)
International -0.106
(0.113)
Constant 0.508 0.471
(0.086)** (0.051)**
Adjusted R-Squared 0.094 0.019
N 463 863
F(10,452)/F(8,854) 7.78 2.28
Prob >F 0.0000 0.0207
**p<0.05,*p<0.10
*(1-favorable, 0-unfavorable)
Model 1
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Table 4: Regression Results for Consistency and Number of Commenters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to increases in the percentage of commenters supporting a rule, there is a trend 
between increased opposition to a proposal and the percentage of rule changes. If more 
commenters are opposed to a proposal, the agency is more likely to change the proposal. Figure 
5 is a scatterplot of rule proposals. The x axis represents the percentage of commenters opposed 
to a proposal, and the y axis represents the percentage of changes made in response to 
commenters’ requests. There is a positive correlation between the two. This finding indicates that 
stakeholders should try to build coalitions of support or opposition when commenting on a 
proposal to achieve favorable outcomes. 
 
Figure 5: Scatter Plot of Percentage Commenter Opposition by Percentage Rule Changes 
(Left-HHS, Right-SEC) 
HHS Regression Results SEC Regression Results
Favorable Outcome* Favorable Outcome*
Average Position 0.802 0.730
(0.128)** (0.094)**
Average Evidence 0.326 -0.060
(0.140)** (0.087)
Number of Commenters 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.001)**
Constant 0.02 0.273
(0.131) (0.093)*
Adjusted R-Squared 0.63 0.65
N 29 35
F(3,25)/F(3,31) 127.61 26.65
Prob >F 0 0
**p<0.05,*p<0.10
*(averaged over rule proposal)
Model 2
                                                                              
       _cons     .3067204   .1010884     3.03   0.005     .1005492    .5128915
      sumCom     .0011583   .0005135     2.26   0.031     .0001109    .0022057
      avgEvd    -.0568524   .0938754    -0.61   0.549    -.2483125    .1346077
      avgPos     .6913582   .1115022     6.20   0.000     .4639481    .9187684
                                                                              
     avgRes1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                Root MSE          =     .15975
                                                R-squared         =     0.5309
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(3, 31)          =      16.96
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =         35
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Conclusion 
After Dodd-Frank and the Affordable Care Act became law, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Department of Health and Human Services were tasked with implementing 
two major policy overhauls. The new laws undoubtedly caught the attention of organized 
interests and individuals alike who viewed them as either major costs or major opportunities. 
This thesis examined the effects that heightened salience had on how agencies respond to public 
comments, what factors influence those responses, and what biases the agencies exhibit toward 
commenters. Furthermore, by comparing the effects of comment types and comment-specific 
variables on rule outcomes between a traditional regulatory bureaucracy and a public service 
agency, this thesis has shown that not all bureaucracies are lobbied in the same way, and as 
result, they exhibit different types of biases towards their stakeholders.  
Overall, privileged commenters like large businesses, consumer advocates, and 
associations with resources and staff dedicated to submitting comments were able to achieve 
favorable outcomes more so than other groups. HHS seemed to favor consumer groups whereas 
the SEC favored business interests. Surprisingly, frequent commenters did not receive any 
preferential treatment by either agency despite having an ongoing relationship with the agencies. 
This suggests that agencies may avoid the impulse to side with frequent commenters. The 
number of comments on a proposal, did not result in favorable outcomes for commenters either. 
Though agencies may still give more consideration to proposals with high salience, the number 
of commenters on a rule does not result in more favorable outcomes. The consistency of 
commenters, however, is a meaningful predictor of favorable outcomes. When a high percentage 
of commenters support a proposal, the agency is more likely to keep the proposal as is. This 
makes sense because an agency may tend to side with commenters that agree with them. 
However, if a high percentage of commenters oppose a proposal, the agency is also more likely 
to change the rule. In either case, these results show that interests have an incentive to build 
coalitions when commenting on rules to express a high level of support or opposition to a 
proposal in order to achieve results.  
Beyond the general trends, a comparison between the SEC and HHS results showed a 
stark contrast between a traditional regulatory agency and a public service agency. HHS was less 
likely to change their rules, whereas the SEC changed their rules over twice as many times. 
Furthermore, the SEC and HHS had distinctly different distributions of commenters. HHS 
regulates a broad group of stakeholders including individuals, states, insurers, and providers of 
health care, which were all represented in the comments. Individuals, consumer groups, and 
government commenters commented the most. As a financial regulatory agency, the SEC’s 
commenter base was more narrow, predominantly consisting of associations and industry 
commenters in the finance industry.  
Testing for agency bias confirmed that the two types of agencies exhibit different types of 
biases towards commenter types. The SEC exhibited a bias towards its industry clientele of 
financial companies and associations, while HHS exhibited bias towards consumer groups and 
academics. This finding supported the hypothesis that the SEC has a bias towards business, but 
refuted the hypothesis that HHS would not be biased towards any particular type of commenter. 
 While these biases are important to consider, the type of commenter is not a good 
predictor of favorable rule outcomes, which indicates that other factors change agencies’ minds 
about proposed rules. This is a reassuring finding. It may indicate that the SEC and HHS mostly 
change rules based on the context of a commenter’s argument. If this is the case, then organized 
interests do not have a substantial influence over the SEC or HHS. Nevertheless, bureaucrats 
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should attempt to limit bias by adhering to professional standards and carefully monitoring their 
decisions. 
Further research needs to continue expanding our knowledge of the bureaucracies and 
how they operate. Because this thesis only examines specific rules from a small sample of 
agencies over the course of two years, little can be said about the bureaucracy as a whole. By 
expanding the data across time and organizations and incorporating more robust models to 
analyze casual mechanisms, researchers can shed more light on what influences bureaucrats’ 
decisions. And as time changes, so do bureaucracies, which will require a constant oversight of 
their operations and potential sources of influence. As the largest and arguably most integrated 
part of the government in our daily lives, understanding the bureaucracies are paramount to a 
high functioning society. Dedicating time to this research will not only ensure a better 
understanding of how bureaucracies work and how they can improve, but also shed light on their 
democratic accountability and ability to carry out their mission. 
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Appendix: Coding Methodology 
 
Commenter Position: This dummy variable measured whether a comment request or mention supported 
or did not support a rule.  
0-comment request/mention doesn’t support the rule 
1- Comment request/mention supports the rule 
 
Agency Response: This dummy variable coded the agency’s response to a request and was used to 
determine favorable outcomes.  
-1-rule changes in opposite direction of commenter’s request/mention 
 0-rule does not change 
 1-rule changes in favor of commenter’s request/mention 
 
Favorable Outcomes: A dummy variable measuring whether an agency response was favorable to 
comment request/mention. 
0- Agency response was unfavorable to a comment request/mention (If a commenter supported 
the rule, and it was changed, or if a commenter opposed the rule, and it was not changed or 
changed in the opposite direction the commenter wanted). 
1- Agency response was favorable to a comment request/mention (If a commenter supported the 
rule, and it was not changed, or if a commenter opposed the rule, and it was changed 
accordingly). 
 
Evidence: A dummy variable measuring whether a comment request/mention had some reasoning, data, 
or example(s) supporting the commenter’s position. 
 0-no evidence 
 1-some form of evidence 
 
Repeat Commenter: A dummy variable measuring whether a comment request/mention came from a 
commenter who commented on two or more rules published by that agency or re-openings of comment 
periods on those rules from the dataset. 
 0-Comment request/mention came from a commenter who commented only once 
 1-Comment request/mention came from a commenter who commented more than once 
 
Type of Commenter: Dummy variables for particular types of commenters. 
0- comment request/mention did not come from a particular type of commenter 
1- comment request/mention came from a particular type of commenter 
Individual-Commenter was a single person 
Association- Commenter was a trade or professional association, labor union, etc. 
Consumer Group – Commenter represented consumer or public interests 
Government – Commenter belonged to a local, state, or federal government 
Industry- Commenter was a business or corporation 
Health Care Industry- includes health care plans, associations, and professionals. The comment 
letters did not distinguish these categories so they were grouped together specifically for the HHS 
data. 
Academic- Commenter was a think tank, professor, or academic institution 
Legal-Commenter was an attorney/law firm 
International- Commenter was an organization or government located outside the United States 
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